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was sexual strain caused by masturbation
and by general sexual incontinence. Proper
attention to this issue is lacking.
These two points notwithstanding,
Cultures ofneurasthenia is a great collection
that deserves a wide readership and
Gijswijt-Hofstra's introduction pulls the
many themes together very well.
Ivan Crozier,
European College of
Liberal Arts,
Berlin
John P Wright and Paul Potter (eds),
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Clarendon Press, 2000, pp. xii, 298, £45.00
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As the introduction to this book states:
"Few subjects have stimulated a more
intensive intellectual interchange than the
nature of the human soul and its
relationship to the body" (p. 3). All thirteen
chapters are published here for the first
time. The first four examine the developing
conceptualization of the soul and its
relationship to the body as perceived by the
Greeks. Much here is familiar but well
presented. In the Hippocratic Corpus, as
Beate Gundert notes, "the psychic is
interpreted in terms of the body, its
structures, and its processes, or not at all"
(p. 35). However, as Tom Robinson
remarks, in Plato we have "the first fully
articulated account of the relationship
between soul (psyche) and body (s6ma)"
(p. 37). Robinson summarizes how Plato
dealt with the problem of "relating a
physical substance to its immaterial one,
and to the end he openly admits his
bafflement" (p. 55). That bafflement would
echo down the ages. Philip van der Eijk
examines Aristotle's handling of dualism,
concluding that Aristotle might have
posited the concept of nous to avoid "the
apparently mechanistic and deterministic
implications of this bio-medical approach to
the soul" (p. 75). Heinrich von Staden
summarizes Hellenistic theories of the soul
and body, stressing the revolutionary impact
of the anatomical and physiological
advances of Herophilus and Erasistratus on
Stoicism as well as Galen's debt. Theo
Heckel cogently presents how St Paul tried
to convince Platonizing Corinthians that the
body is not merely a passive receptacle for
the soul. Gareth Matthews examines
Augustine's use of "for the first time, an
argument for dualism that is essentially
intemalist" (p. 134). Renaissance theories
are discussed by Emily Michael, where the
discussion shifted to the question of the
soul's immortality (p. 156), and the
elaboration and separation of the extended,
corporeal soul and the incorporeal,
immortal mind (pp. 164-5).
As Stephen Voss notes in chapter 8,
whilst for Aristotelians the study of the soul
was part of the "science of nature",
Descartes' groundbreaking step was to
exclude the soul from the scope of physical
enquiry (p. 176). The remaining five
chapters deal with this Cartesian legacy.
Thomas Lennon discusses how Pierre Bayle
recorded and annotated the debate among
materialists, Cartesians, and Leibnizian
monadology. Francois Duchesneau
examines the animism of Georg Stahl and
his polemic with Leibniz. John Wright
discusses two types of dualism in
eighteenth-century medicine: "substance
dualism", which held that body and soul
consisted of different and incompatible
substances, and "function dualism", which
assigned thought functions to the soul
(mind) and life functions to the body. These
two groups were closer than they
maintained. Roselyne Rey looks at vitalism
in the second half of the eighteenth century.
Instead of examining the ontological status
of the soul, vitalists stated that the essential
property of living matter was sensibility
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(p. 258). That this could take on the
functions of the soul was recognized (and
welcomed). Francois Azouvi examines the
work of Pierre Cabanais. Drawing from his
predecessors, Cabanais distinguished
physical man from moral or interior man,
whose nature resides in the brain. Since the
brain acts upon the other organs, then the
physical/moral relationship is essentially
physical (p. 272). This new type of dualism
led to the "physical/psychological dualism"
of twentieth-century psychology (pp. 278-9).
Although there are absent friends
(Neoplatonism and Avicenna, for example),
and Galen's work and influence would have
been better handled in a separate chapter,
this book is a thoughtful introduction to the
soul-body relationship and its continuing
relevance.
Julius Rocca,
Karolinska Institute,
Stockholm
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Plagues, poisons and potions is a
thorough-going description of the
deliberations, legislation, and conspiracies
in Geneva during plague time taken from
two sources: criminal records, which begin
in 1390, and the minutes of the city
council, which begin in 1409. Naphy's
analysis stretches from the earliest
references to plague in these sources
(1459) to the plague's final assault in
1640. He argues persuasively against
common assumptions that conspiracies to
spread plague in the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries were coupled with
and dependent on witchcraft either in the
minds of the accused or the prosecuting
bodies. Except for the plague of 1571,
where witchcraft became a principal crime,
charges of sorcery were altogether missing
from the criminal investigations of both
earlier and later plagues in Geneva.
Instead of depending on the supernatural
as with witchcraft prosecutions, the trials
of those accused of spreading plague
relied on accusations that pinpointed a
small and interrelated community of
health professionals, principally those who
cleaned and cleared the houses of the
plague dead, and on physical
evidence-boxes of grease concocted from
recipes that mixed pus from the buboes of
the plague stricken that was allegedly
smeared on doors to spread plague.
Further, the motivation interpreted by the
courts for such atrocities was not the
work of Satan or dependent on other
supernatural phenomena but instead
turned on the mundane-personal profit.
Indeed, Naphy sides with the
prosecution, seeing these trials less as
figments of the imagination of a war-
wearied, plague-battered, religiously
intolerant, and paranoid ruling class and
more as actual cases of human greed, acts
of ambition or survival. First, Naphy
argues that consistently, through the
sixteenth century, the magistrates rebuked
initial accusations of plague spreading and
made charges of plague conspiracy only
after a large volume of testimony and
other circumstantial evidence had been
accumulated. Secondly, he claims that
torture was not a device to drive such
accusations from the mouths of the
innocent; rather, it was applied as a last
resort, in fact, after a court in the English
common law tradition would have already
convicted the accused. Thirdly, he shows
that those charged with spreading the
plague came almost exclusively from the
health services, whose employment
depended on the plague's perpetuation.
Plague not only afforded them their
employment, it gave them free range
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